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Innovation is often seen as carried out by highly educated labour in R&D intensive com-
panies with strong ties to leading centers of excellence in the scientific world. Seen from this 
angle innovation is a typical “first world” activity. There is, however, another way to look at 
innovation that goes significantly beyond this high-tech picture. In this, broader, perspective, 
innovation – the attempt to try out new or improved products, processes or ways to do things 
– is an aspect of most if not all economic activities. In this sense, it is argued (section one), 
innovation may be as relevant in the developing part of the world as elsewhere. Section two 
discusses the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the subject. An important con-
clusion is that to be able to exploit technology to their own advantage, developing countries 
need to develop the necessary capabilities for doing so. But what are these capabilities and 
how can they be measured? The third section of the paper surveys attempts to identify and 
measure capabilities as the national level. However, the development of such capabilities, it is 
shown, depends in important ways on what firms do. Section four, therefore, focuses on re-
cent attempt to survey innovation activity in firms in developing countries and what can be 
learnt from that. Section five discusses the role of domestic versus foreign sources in foster-
ing innovation in the developing part of the world. The final section summarizes the main 
lessons. 
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Is innovation important for development? And if so, how? The answers to these questions 
depend, we will argue, on what is meant by the term innovation. One popular perception of 
innovation, that one meets in media every day, is that has to do with developing brand new, 
advanced solutions for sophisticated, well-off customers, through exploitation of the most 
recent advances in knowledge. Such innovation is normally seen as carried out by highly 
educated labour in R&D intensive companies, being large or small, with strong ties to leading 
centers of excellence in the scientific world. Hence innovation in this sense is a typical “first 
world” activity.  
There is, however, another way to look at innovation that goes significantly beyond 
the high-tech picture just described. In this broader perspective, innovation – the attempt to 
try out new or improved products, processes or ways to do things – is an aspect of most if not 
all economic activities (Kline and Rosenberg 1986, Bell and Pavitt 1993). It includes not only 
technologically new products and processes but also improvements in areas such as logistics, 
distribution and marketing. Even in so-called low-tech industries, there may be a lot of inno-
vation going on, and the economic effects may be very large (von Tunzelmann and Acha 
2004). Moreover, the term innovation may also be used for changes that are new to the local 
context, even if the contribution to the global knowledge frontier is negligible. In this broader 
sense, innovation may be as relevant in the developing part of the world as elsewhere. Al-
though many of the outcomes are less glamorous than celebrated breakthroughs in the high-
tech world, there is no reason to believe that their cumulative social and economic impact is 
smaller (Fagerberg, et al. 2004). In this broader perspective, innovation becomes as important 
for developing countries as for the rich part of the world, an argument which is also strongly 
supported by evidence from the surveys of innovation activities in firms referred to below.  
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It is fair to say that the question of how technology and innovation influence eco-
nomic development is a controversial issue, and has been so for a long time (Fagerberg and 
Godinho 2004). In section 2 of this chapter we trace the discussions back to Torstein Ve-
blen’s writings about Germany’s industrialization nearly a century ago. Here Veblen pointed 
to some of the issues, such as the nature of technology, the conditions for technological catch 
up etc., that have been central to the discussion to the present day. In fact, he was very opti-
mistic about the possibilities for technological and economic catch-up by poorer economies. 
This optimistic mood came to be shared by neoclassical economists when they, nearly half a 
century later, turned their attention to the same issues. In this conception of reality, technol-
ogy was assumed to be a so-called “public good”, freely available for everyone everywhere. 
Hence, a common interpretation of neoclassical growth theory (Solow 1956) has been that 
catch up and convergence in the global economy will occur automatically (and quickly) as 
long as market forces are allowed to “do their job”.  
However, writers from several other strands, such as economic historians, with Alex-
ander Gerschenkron (1962) as the prime example, or economists inspired by the revival of 
interest in Joseph Schumpeter’s works that took place from the 1960s onwards, have been 
much less optimistic in this regard. According to these writers, there is nothing automatic 
about technological catch up. It requires considerable effort and organizational and institu-
tional change to succeed (Ames and Rosenberg 1963). A central theme in the literature on the 
subject concerns the various “capabilities” that firms, industries and countries need to gener-
ate in order to escape the low development trap. Following this perspective, countries that do 
not succeed in developing appropriate technological capabilities and other complementary 
conditions should be expected to continue to lag behind. Concepts such as “social capability” 
(Ohkawa  and  Rosovsky  1974,  Abramovitz  1986),  “technological  capability”  (Kim  1980, 
1997), “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levintal 1990) and “innovation system” (Lundvall  
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1992, Nelson 1993, Edquist 1997) have been suggested and a burgeoning empirical literature 
has emerged focusing on these aspects of development (see Fagerberg and Godinho 2004, 
Archibugi and Coco 2005 for overviews). In section 2 of this chapter we explore the different 
suggestions and consider the relevance for development. 
Having dealt with what the literature on catch-up and economic growth has to say, we 
move in section 3 closer to the empirical evidence on the subject matter. Until relatively re-
cently there has not been much data available that could be exploited to explore the relation-
ship between innovation and diffusion of technology on the one hand, and economic devel-
opment on the other. But during the last few decades, national governments and international 
organizations started to devote more efforts to collect statistics on factors relevant for innova-
tion and diffusion, and various attempts have been made to capitalize on these investments to 
produce indicators of the technological capabilities (or competiveness) of countries, including 
the developing ones.  
Although many of the data sources used to illustrate country-level technological capa-
bilities reflect activities at the firm-level, direct information on innovation activities of firms 
has been scarce. However, from the early 1990s, some countries, mainly in Europe, started to 
survey innovation activities in firms, and more recently such surveys have also been con-
ducted in the developing part of the world. These surveys are based on a broad notion of in-
novation, including not only those that are “new to the world,” and therefore have the poten-
tial to reveal important insights about innovation activities in such economies. We explore 
this ongoing work in section 4 of this chapter.  
Finally, in section 5 we turn to another controversial issue, namely the extent to which 
technological activities in developing countries depend mainly on “spillovers” from the outer 
world. Much economic theorizing and applied work (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991, 
Coe and Helpman 1995) suggest that for all but the largest countries of the world, foreign  
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sources dominate and much policy advice to developing countries has been based on this pre-
sumption. Critics contend that this is not only a question of access to technology but also 
about the ability to absorb it in a way conducive to development. We examine the evidence 
that has been brought to the table on this issue. Section 6 sums up our current knowledge 
about innovation and development.  
 
2. Innovation, catching-up and falling behind - taking stock of the 
literature 
 
This section provides an introduction to the main strands of literature of relevance for our 
topic. The so-called “old” neoclassical growth theory of the 1950s provides a useful starting 
point. As mentioned above this theory was based on the idea of technology as a public good, 
freely available to everybody anywhere and hence a powerful equilibrating force in the global 
economy. However, as we show, applied work based on this perspective soon confirmed that 
the optimistic scenario of this theory did not really fit the evidence, and this led to a search 
for alternative ways to understand the role of technology and innovation for economic devel-
opment.  
Another strand, which particularly gained currency during the 1980s and 1990s, al-
though some contributions were older, was based on the work of several prominent historians 
(and other social scientists) who argued that in practice the successful exploitation of tech-
nology for development depends on the ability of a country to generate the necessary “capa-
bilities” for doing so. What these capabilities are and how (and why) they matter are among 
the central questions addressed in the voluminous literature that has emerged and which we 
survey in the following. Some of the topics addressed in the “capability” literature, such as,  
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for example, the role of institutions and policy for technological and economic development, 
are also central to the so-called “new growth theory” that developed from the mid 1980s on-
wards , and we discuss the implications of this approach for our topic towards the end of this 
section. 
 
 “Old” neoclassical growth theory: An optimistic scenario 
  
Intuitively, most people easily accept the idea that knowledge and economic devel-
opment are intimately related, and hence that access to knowledge should be regarded as a 
vital factor for developing countries. However, this is not the way development used to be 
explained by economists. From the birth of the so-called “classical political economy” more 
than two hundred years ago, economists have focused on accumulated capital per worker 
when trying to explain differences in income or productivity. Similarly, differences in eco-
nomic growth have been seen as reflecting different rates of capital accumulation. This per-
spective arguably reflects the important role played by “mechanization” as a mean for pro-
ductivity advance during the so-called (first) Industrial Revolution, the period during which 
the frame of reference for much economic reasoning was formed.  
Closer to our own age, Robert Solow adopted this perspective in his so-called “neo-
classical growth theory” (Solow 1956). Solow’s model was based on standard neoclassical 
assumptions, such as perfect competition (and information), maximizing behaviour, no exter-
nalities, positive and decreasing marginal products, absence of scale economies, etc. In this 
model, productivity growth results from increases in the amount of capital that each worker is 
set to operate. But as capital per worker increases the marginal productivity of capital de-
clines, and with it the scope for further increases in the capital-labour ratio. Ultimately, the 
capital-labour ratio approaches a constant, and productivity growth ceases. In this long-run  
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equilibrium gross domestic product, the capital stock and the labour force all grow at the 
same, exogenously determined rate.  
However, to allow for long-run growth in GDP per capita, Solow (1956) added an ex-
ogenous term, labelled "technological progress". In this interpretation, technology - or know-
ledge - is a "public" good, i.e., something that is accessible for everybody free of charge. 
Solow did not discuss the implications of this for a multi-country world but subsequent re-
search based on the neoclassical perspective took it for granted that if technology - or know-
ledge - is freely available in, say, the USA, it will be so at the global level as well. The fol-
lowing remark by one of the leading empirical researchers in the field is typical in this re-
spect: "Because knowledge is an international commodity, I should expect the contribution of 
advances of knowledge (...) to be of about the same size in all the countries..." (Denison 
1967, p. 282). On this assumption the neoclassical model of economic growth predicts that, in 
the long run, GDP per capita in all countries will grow at the same, exogenously determined 
rate of global technological progress.  
The only factor left within this framework that could possibly explain differences in 
per capita growth across countries is so-called "transitional dynamics": since initial condi-
tions generally differ, countries may grow at different rates in the process towards long-run 
equilibrium. A case can be made, then, for poor countries growing faster than the richer ones 
because countries where capital is scarce compared to labour (i.e., where the capital-labour 
ratio is low) should be expected to have a higher rate of return on capital, a higher rate of 
capital accumulation and higher per capita growth. To the extent that capital is internationally 
mobile and moves to the countries where the prospects for profits are highest, this tendency 
should be considerably strengthened. Hence, the gaps in income levels between rich and poor 




It soon became clear, however, that this could not be the whole story. From the late 
1950s onwards empirical research on factors affecting long run-growth grew steadily. Much 
in the same way as the post-war work on national accounts decomposed GDP into its con-
stituent parts, the empirical research on growth attempted to decompose growth of GDP (so-
called "growth accounting"). One of the first calculations of this kind was carried out by 
Moses Abramovitz (1956) in a historical study of US growth. His results indicated that only a 
small part of US productivity growth could be explained by factor growth. Thus, the major 
part of US productivity growth remained unexplained (the “residual”) and had to be classified 
as so-called total factor productivity growth. Abramovitz's comment was: "This result is sur-
prising (...) Since we know little about the causes of productivity increase, the indicated im-
portance of this element may be taken to be some sort of measure of our ignorance about the 
causes of economic growth". (Abramovitz 1956, p. 11). This result was soon corroborated by 
other studies (Solow 1957, Kendrick 1961 and Denison 1962) and has since been repeated 
many times for different data sets (see Easterly and Levine 2001 for a good overview of the 
more recent evidence on the subject). Although several attempts have been made to "squeeze 
down the residual" as Nelson (1981) put it,
1 the result – that a theory that only focuses on 
factor growth is unlikely to explain long run growth very well - is now generally accepted.  
Moreover, what came to be seen as the central prediction of theory – that convergence 
between rich and poor countries should be expected – was shown not to be consistent with 
the facts either (Islam 2003). In fact, the long run trend since the Industrial Revolution has 
been towards divergence, not convergence in productivity and income. For example, accord-
ing to the economic historian David Landes, the difference in income or productivity per 
                                                 
1 Two avenues were followed “to squeeze down the residual”. One has been to embody, as much as possible, 
technological progress into the factors themselves by adjusting for shifts in quality, composition etc. (Denison 
1962, Jorgenson and Griliches 1967, Maddison 1987). Another approach in this literature, originally developed 
by Denison (1962), has been to add other possible explanatory variables, such as structural change, economies 
of scale, etc. The list may in some cases be quite long. The reader is referred to the surveys by Maddison (1987) 




head between the richest and poorest country in the world has substantially increased over the 
last 250 years (Landes 1998). Although different sources may give different estimates for this 
increase, the qualitative interpretation remains the same. 
 
Knowledge and development 
 
This leads us back to where we started, namely the role of knowledge in growth. “Know-
ledge,” or “knowing things,” may take many forms. It may be theoretical, based on an elabo-
rate understanding of the phenomena under scrutiny. But it may also be practical, based on, 
say, cause-effect relationships that have been shown to hold in practice, although a total un-
derstanding of the underlying causes may be lacking. It may be created through search or 
learning but it may also be acquired through education or training or simply by observing 
what others do and trying to imitate it. The creation (or acquisition) of knowledge does not 
require an economic motive (or effect), although this is quite common. The subset of know-
ledge that deals with how to produce and distribute goods and services, which is what interest 
economists most, is usually labelled “Technology.”
 An open question is whether the concept 
of technology only refers to knowledge about physical processes (“hardware”), or if it also 
includes knowledge about, say, how to organize/manage these (“software”). For the purpose 
of economic analysis, the latter, broad interpretation of the term is clearly the most meaning-
ful. Arguably, mastery of physical processes is of dubious value if one doesn’t know how to 
embed these in a well-organized production and distribution system. 
As mentioned in the introduction the role of technology – and hence innovation – for 
catch-up processes has been a highly controversial topic for at least a century. Torstein Ve-
blen, who is often credited with being the first to provide an analytical framework for the 
analysis of catch-up processes, provides a useful starting point for our discussion. In his an- 
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alysis of Germany’s catch-up vis-à-vis the then economically leading country, the UK, Ve-
blen (1915) put forward the argument that recent technological changes had altered the condi-
tions for industrialization in latecomer economies. In earlier times, he argued, the diffusion of 
technology had been hampered by the fact that technology was mostly embodied in persons, 
so that migration of skilled workers was a necessary prerequisite for its spread across differ-
ent locations. However, with the advent of “machine technology”, as he put it, this logic had 
changed (ibid, p. 191). In contrast to the conditions that had prevailed previously, Veblen 
argued, this new type of knowledge “can be held and transmitted in definite and unequivocal 
shape, and the acquisition of it by such transfer is no laborious or uncertain matter” (ibid).  
Although Veblen did not use the terminology that is now commonly applied to the 
process he described, it is pretty clear what he had in mind. Effectively, what he was arguing 
is that while technology was previously “tacit” and embodied in persons, it later became 
more “codified” and easily transmittable. Hence, catch-up should be expected to be relatively 
easy, and was, under “otherwise suitable circumstances,” largely “a question of the pecuniary 
inducement and (…) opportunities offered by this new industry” (ibid., p. 192). Since the 
latecomers could take over the new technology “ready-made”, without having to share the 
costs of its development, this might be expected to be a very profitable affair (ibid, p. 249). 
This being the case, Veblen predicted that other European countries, e.g., France, Italy and 
Russia, would soon follow suit (he also mentioned the case of Japan). 
As noted this perspective of technology was later wholeheartedly adopted by standard 
neoclassical economics. Following that approach, knowledge should be seen as a body of 
information, freely available to all interested, that could be used over and over again (without 
being depleted). Obviously, if this is what knowledge is about, it should be expected to ben-
efit everybody all over the globe to the same extent, and cannot be used to explain differences 
in growth and development. It is understandable, therefore, that the first systematic attempts  
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to use knowledge to explain differences in economic development did not come from eco-
nomics proper but from economic historians (many of whom came to look at knowledge or 
technology in a rather different way from the prevailing view in economics). Rather than 
something that exists in the public domain and can be exploited by anybody everywhere free 
of charge, technological knowledge, whether created through learning or organized R&D, is 
in this tradition seen as deeply rooted in the specific capabilities of private firms and their 
networks/environments,  and  hence  not  easily  transferable.  Compared  with  the  traditional 
neoclassical growth theory discussed earlier these writers painted a much bleaker picture of 
the prospects for catch-up. According to this latter view there is nothing automatic about 
catch up: it requires a lot of effort and capability-building on the part of the backward coun-
try. 
 
What it takes to catch up: The need for “new institutional instruments”  
 
The economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron set the stage for much of the subsequent 
literature (Gerschenkron 1962). Some countries are at the technological frontier, he pointed 
out, while others lag behind. Although the technological gap between a frontier country and a 
laggard represents “a great promise” for the latter, a potential for high growth through imitat-
ing frontier technologies, there are also various problems that may prevent backward count-
ries from reaping the potential benefits to the full extent. His favourite example was the Ger-
man attempt to catch up with the UK more than a century ago. When the UK industrialized, 
technology was relatively labour-intensive and small scale. But in the course of time technol-
ogy became much more capital and scale intensive, so when Germany entered the scene, the 
conditions for entry had changed considerably. Because of this, Gerschenkron argued, Ger-
many had to develop new institutional instruments for overcoming these obstacles, above all  
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in the financial sector, “instruments for which there was little or no counterpart in an estab-
lished industrial country” (ibid, p. 7). He held these experiences to be valid also for other 
technologically lagging countries. 
Gerschenkron’s work is often associated with his focus on investment banks, which 
he saw as critical in mobilizing resources for development. However, as pointed out by Shin 
(1996), it is possible to see his writings as an attempt to arrive at a more general understand-
ing of the conditions for catch-up, focusing on the instruments - or capabilities to use a more 
recent term - that need to be in place for successful catch-up to take place and the roles that 
public and private sector actors may play in generating these capabilities. Shin also em-
phasizes the historically contingent nature of the capabilities needed for catch up. For exam-
ple, the factors that constrained German catch-up towards the end of the nineteenth century 
are not necessarily the same as those experienced by Japan in the early post World War Two 
period or other Asian countries more recently. Hence, while the need for such capabilities 
may be a quite general phenomenon, their precise nature may well differ between historical 
time-periods, industries/sectors and levels of development. 
 
Social capability and absorptive capacity 
 
Moses Abramovitz, arguing along similar lines as Gerschenkron, also placed emphasis on the 
potential for catch-up
2 by late-comers. He suggested that differences in countries’ abilities to 
exploit this potential might to some extent be explained with the help of two concepts, tech-
nological congruence and social capability.
3 The first concept refers to the degree to which 
leader and follower country characteristics are congruent in areas such as market size, factor 
                                                 
2 He defined it as follows: “This is a potential that reflects these countries’ greater opportunity to advance by 
borrowing and adapting the best practice technology and organization of more productive economies” (Abra-
movitz 1994b, p. 87). 
3 The term “social capability” comes from Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1974).  
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supply etc. For example, the technological system that emerged in the USA towards the end 
of the nineteenth century was highly dependent on access to a large, homogenous market, 
something that hardly existed in Europe at the time, which may help to explain its slow diffu-
sion there. The second concept points to the capabilities that developing countries have to 
develop in order to catch up, such as improving education (particularly technical) and the 
business infrastructure (including the financial system). Abramovitz explained the successful 
catch up of Western Europe in relation to the US in the first half of the post World War Two 
period as the result of both increasing technological congruence and improved social capa-
bilities. As an example of the former he mentioned how European economic integration led 
to the creation of larger and more homogenous markets in Europe, facilitating the transfer of 
scale-intensive technologies initially developed for US conditions. Regarding the latter, he 
pointed among other things to such factors as the general increases in educational levels and 
how effective the financial system had become in mobilizing resources for change.  
  The concept “social capability” soon became very popular in applied work. Neverthe-
less it is, as Abramovitz himself admitted, quite “vaguely” defined (Abramovitz 1994a, p. 25) 
and this has left a wide scope for different interpretations. But although Abramovitz found it 
hard to measure, it is not true that he lacked clear ideas about what the concept was intended 
to cover. These are some of the aspects that he considered to be particularly relevant (Abra-
movitz 1986, 1994a, b): 
-  technical competence (level of education)  
-  experience in the organization and management of large scale enterprises 
-  financial institutions and markets capable of mobilizing capital on a large scale  
-  honesty and trust 
-  the stability of government and its effectiveness in defining (enforcing) rules and 
supporting economic growth   
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 A related concept that has become popular concept in the applied literature on growth 
and development is “absorptive capacity”.
 The term itself is not new. In development eco-
nomics it has been used for a long time, as the ability of a developing country to absorb new 
investments more generally (Adler 1965, Eckaus 1973). However, as the role of knowledge 
for growth and development became more widely recognized, it came to be associated with 
the ability to absorb knowledge. Rostow (1980, p. 267-277) summarized this new perspective 
well : “economic growth depends on the rate of absorption of the existing and unfolding 
stock of relevant knowledge; the rate of absorption depends on the availability of both trained 
men and capital; the reason for the accelerated growth among (…) middle-income countries 
is that they have built up the stock of trained man-power (including entrepreneurs) to a posi-
tion where they can accelerate the rate of absorption of the existing stock of knowledge”.   
Wesley Cohen and Daniel Levinthal, in an influential contribution (Cohen and Levin-
thal 1990), applied the concept to the firm level. They defined it as “the ability of a firm to 
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial 
ends” (ibid p. 128). In this meaning of the term it became widely used in analyses of interna-
tional technology spillovers, which we discuss below (Section 5). Cohen and Levinthal saw 
absorptive capacity as dependent on the firm’s prior related knowledge, which in turn was 
assumed to reflect its cumulative R&D. However, they also noted that the path dependent 
nature of cumulative learning might make it difficult for a firm to acquire new knowledge 
created outside its own specialized field, and that it therefore was important for firms to retain 
a certain degree of diversity in its knowledge base through, among other things, nurturing 
linkages with holders of knowledge outside its own organization.   
Although the focus of Cohen and Levinthal was on firms, many of the same consider-
ations apply, as emphasized above, at more aggregate levels, such as regions or countries 
(Keller 1996, Eaton and Kortum 1999, Griffith et al. 2004), and the term has continued to be  
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used at these levels as well. It should be noted, however, that the concept as used by Cohen 
and Levinthal combines three different processes into one, namely (1) search, (2) assimilation 
(or absorption) of what is found and (3) its commercial application. Hence, it refers not only 
to “absorption” in the received meaning of the term, but also on the ability to exploit and cre-
ate knowledge more generally. The authors defend this by arguing - with reference to rel-
evant psychological literature - that the ability to assimilate existing and the ability to create 
new knowledge are so similar so there is no point in distinguishing between them (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990, p. 130). In contrast, Zahra and George (2002), in a review of the literature, 
argue that the skills required for creating and managing knowledge differ from those related 
to its exploitation and that the two therefore deserve to be treated and measured separately. 
They term the latter “transformative capacity”. In a similar vein Fagerberg (1988) and Fager-
berg, et al. (2007), in an analysis of capabilities at the country level, distinguish between a 
country’s ability to compete on technology (what they term “technology competitiveness”) 
and its ability to exploit technology commercially independently of where it was first created 




Gerschenkron  and  Abramovitz  focused  mainly  on  evidence  from  Europe  and  the  United 
States. But from the 1970s onwards several studies of catch-up (or lack of such) in other parts 
of the world emerged. For example there is by now an ample literature demonstrating that the 
catch-up of not only Japan (Johnson 1982) but also other so-called “newly industrializing 
countries” in Asia (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, Hobday 1995, Kim 1997, Nelson and Pack 
1999, Kim and Nelson 2000) was associated with conscious capability building. One case 
which received much attention was the rise of Korea from being one of the poorest countries  
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in the world to a first world technological powerhouse in just three decades. Linsu Kim, who 
made the authoritative study on the subject, used the concept “technological capability” (Kim 
1980) as an analytical device to interpret the Korean evidence. He defined it as “the ability to 
make effective use of technological knowledge in efforts to assimilate, use, adapt and change 
existing technologies. It also enables one to create new technologies and to develop new pro-
ducts and processes…” (Kim 1997, p. 4). Hence, the concept includes not only organized 
R&D, which arguably is a small activity in many developing countries, but also other capa-
bilities needed for the commercial exploitation of technology.
4  
Kim’s analyses were based on lessons from how Korean electronics firms, such as 
Samsung, gradually upgraded from a passive role of implementing imported technology, to a 
more active role of introducing incremental improvements, and eventually ventured into the 
forefront  of  innovation-based  competition  in  the  industry  (the  so-called  implementation-
assimilation-improvement sequence). He expected the requirements to become more strin-
gent, in particular with respect to innovation capabilities, as countries climb up the develop-
ment ladder. Thus, following this view, for a firm or country in the process of catching up, 
the appropriate level of technological capability would be a moving target, in constant need 
of improvement (Bell and Pavitt 1993).  
It has become common in the literature (see, e.g., Dahlman et al, 1987, Kim 1997, 
Romijn 1999) to consider three aspects of technological capability: production capability, 
investment capability and innovation capability. Production capability is needed to operate 
productive facilities efficiently and to adapt production to changing market circumstances. 
Investment capability is needed to establish new productive facilities and adjust project de-
signs to suit the circumstances of the investment. Finally, innovation capability is required to 
                                                 
4 In fact, the definition of technological capabilities by Kim is quite similar to that of absorptive capacity by 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Kim (1997) uses the two concepts interchangeably.  
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create new technology, e.g., develop new products or services that better meet the specific 
requirements of the market.  
 The origin of the technological capability concept can be traced back to a project on 
“The Acquisition of Technological Capability” organized by Larry Westphal at the World 
Bank in the late 1970s, involving among others Alice Amsden, Jorge Katz, Linsu Kim and 
Sanjaya Lall. The concept has since been used in a large number of studies at various levels 
of aggregation. Initially many studies following this approach concentrated on understanding 
the rapid technological catching up in East Asia (Kim, 1980, 1997, Fransman 1982, Amsden, 
1989, Hobday 1995) and the lack of it elsewhere, such as in Latin America (Teitel 1981, Katz 
1984, Fransman and King 1984), India (Lall 1987) or the former centrally planned economies 
(Hanson and Pavitt 1987). Similar concepts that were proposed at the time, but did not re-
ceive the same recognition, include “technological mastery” (Dahlman and Westphal 1981, 
Fransman 1982) and “technological effort” (Dahlman and Westphal 1982).
5 
Although initially developed for analysis of firms, the concept has also been applied 
to whole industries or countries. Sanjaya Lall, in a survey (Lall 1992), emphasized three as-
pects of “national technological capability” as he phrased it: the ability to muster the neces-
sary (financial) resources and use them efficiently; skills, including not only general educa-
tion but also specialized managerial and technical competence; and what he called “national 
technological effort”, which he associated with measures such as R&D, patents and technical 
personnel. He noted that national technological capability does not only depend on domestic 
technological efforts but also foreign technology acquired through imports of machinery or 
foreign direct investments. Lall also made a distinction between technological capabilities 
proper and their economic effects. These effects, he noted, did also depend on the incentives 
                                                 
5 For good overviews of this literature see Dahlman and Westphal (1982), Fransman and King (1984), Evenson 
and Westphal (1995), Romijn (1999), Dutrenit (2000) and Figueiredo (2001). For the early literature see also the 
special issues of World Development (no. 5-6, 1984) and Journal of Development Economics, (no. 1-2, 1984). 
For a more recent account see the special issues of Oxford Development Studies (no. 3, 2004) and International 
Journal of Technology Management (no. 1/2/3, 2006).  
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that economic agents face whether resulting from political decision making (e.g., governance) 
or embedded in more long-lasting institutions (the legal framework for example). This rea-
soning is of course very similar to that of Abramovitz. Hence, potentially there is a consider-
able overlap between the concepts of technological and social capabilities: both include as-
pects related to skill formation and finance. We consider the implications of this in more de-
tail in the next section.  
The successful catch-up of a number of “newly industrializing” countries in the 1970s 
and 1980s also served as inspiration for the development of new perspectives on the dynam-
ics of the global economy that placed the development of appropriate technological activities 
(or capabilities) at the core of the analysis (Fagerberg 1987, 1988, Dosi et al. 1990, Ver-
spagen 1991, for an overview see Fagerberg and Godinho 2004). Fagerberg (1987, 1988) has 
suggested an empirical model based on Schumpeterian logic that includes innovation, imita-
tion and other efforts related to the commercial exploitation of technology as driving forces 
of growth. Following this approach, catch-up or convergence is by no means guaranteed. It 
depends on the balance of innovation and imitation, how challenging these activities are and 
the extent to which countries are equipped with the necessary capabilities. According to Ver-
spagen (1991), who implemented similar ideas into a non-linear setting that allows for both 
catch-up and a “low-growth trap”, poor countries with a low “social capability” are the ones 
at risk of being “trapped”. Moreover, evidence presented in Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) 
suggests that the importance of innovation for development is increasing with time, highlight-







National innovation systems 
 
The observation that technological and social factors interact in the process of economic de-
velopment might also be taken as supporting the view that a broader, more systemic approach 
that take such interactions into account is required.
6 Such concerns led during the 1980s and 
1990s to the development of a new systemic approach to the study of countries’ abilities to 
generate and profit from technology, the so-called “national innovation system” approach. 
The concept, first used in public by Christopher Freeman in an analysis of Japan (Freeman 
1987), soon became a popular analytical tool for researchers who wanted to get a firmer grasp 
on the interaction processes underlying a country’s technological and economic development 
(Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993, see Edquist 2004 for an overview). Organizations such as the 
OECD, the EU and the UN intensified their efforts to provide relevant statistics with which 
performance along these lines could be assessed. But the adoption of the innovation system 
approach to developing countries is a relatively recent phenomenon (Viotti 2002, Muchie et 
al. 2003, Lundvall et al. 2006) and arguably still in its infancy. 
Moreover, there is currently no agreement in the literature on how innovation systems 
should be defined and studied empirically. Some researchers in this area emphasise a need for 
developing a common methodology, based on the functions and activities of the system, to 
guide empirical work (Liu and White 2001, Johnson and Jacobsson 2003 and Edquist 2004), 





                                                 
6 Edquist (2004, p. 182), in a survey, argues that national systems of innovation should include “all important 
economic, social, political, organizational, institutional, and other factors that influence the development, diffu-
sion, and use of innovations”.  
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New growth theory 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s economists’ interest in the possible role of knowledge (technol-
ogy) for growth and development increased. On the theoretical front an important develop-
ment was the emergence of the so-called “new growth theory” (Romer 1986, 1990, Aghion 
and Howitt 1992, 1998) according to which differences in economic development across 
countries should be understood as the outcome of differences in endogenous knowledge ac-
cumulation within (largely national) borders. Although some newly created technological 
knowledge may spill over from one country to another, there are according to this approach 
sufficient impediments to this process (being legal, such as intellectual property rights (IPRs), 
or more informal in nature) to secure that in most cases the lion’s share of the benefits will 
accrue to the innovator. Hence, following this approach, long run economic growth should to 
a large extent be expected to depend on appropriability conditions and the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. The increasing attention to IPRs in both developed and develop-
ing countries and their mutual relationship (for example the TRIPS agreement, see Gran-
strand 2004) may to some extent reflect this shift of emphasis in economic theorizing. More-
over, the theory predicts that large countries should be expected to be more innovative, and 
benefit more from innovation, than small countries.  According to the theory, the latter may 
to some extent overcome the disadvantages of scale by practicing free trade and taking a lib-
eral stance towards international capital flows. Hence, following this approach, openness to 
trade and foreign investment is essential for countries that wish to catch up (Grossman and 
Helpman 1991, Coe and Helpman 1995, Coe et al. 1997). 
Although it is widespread view that openness to trade is a positive factor for growth, 
the evidence supporting this conclusion is quite weak (Rodríguez and Rodrik 1999, Rodrik et 
al. 2004, Fagerberg and Srholec 2008). In fact, it appears to be a fairly robust result in the  
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literature that the degree of openness to international transactions, given by imports, inward 
FDI or royalty and license payments abroad, does not discriminate well between countries 
that manage to escape the low development trap and those that continue to be poor. However, 
this does not mean knowledge flows across borders are not important for growth and devel-
opment. We discuss this in more detail in Section 5 of this chapter. 
  
Capabilities and beyond  
 
As our survey so far shows, there is by now a relatively large conceptual and applied litera-
ture on the role of capabilities in development. However, as should be evident from the dis-
cussion, scholars in this area have suggested alternative concepts that are to some extent 
overlapping and often difficult to operationalize. How can measures for concepts such as 
technological and social capability be defined or constructed? And how should the close rela-
tionship between technological capability proper and the broader social, institutional and po-
litical framework, e.g., “social capability,” be taken into account in empirical work? The im-
portance of these matters can hardly be questioned. Abramovitz, who pioneered much of this 
work, was, as noted above, quite pessimistic about the prospects for examining these ques-
tions empirically in a rigorous manner, but as we shall see, the availability of indicators has 
improved a lot in recent years, not the least for “non-economic” aspects of development, and 




3. Measuring national capabilities 
 
As is evident from the preceding section, conceptual work on the role of “capabilities” and 
“innovation systems” for development has flourished during the last few decades. But to what 
extent can these concepts be operationalized empirically? Trying to put numbers on such 
concepts may be a difficult exercise, as Archibugi and Coco (2005) point out. Still there have 
been some attempts in that direction and in this section we will discuss this possibility in 
more detail. For example, Furman et al. (2002) and Furman and Hayes (2004) have suggested 
measuring a country’s innovation system (or its “innovative capacity” as they put it) through 
the number of patents and find that there are large differences in this respect across countries 
at similar levels of income. However, patents refer to inventions, not innovations, and are 
used much more intensively in some industries than others. In fact, the global novelty re-
quirement associated with patents implies that minor innovations/adaptations, which arguably 
make up the bulk of innovative activity world-wide, will not be counted since these are sim-
ply not patentable. Moreover, costs, both financial and opportunity, and the fact that in any 
case, their domestic IP systems may not function very well, may also lead to their low usage 
by inventors in developing countries. Thus, for countries below the technology frontier, and 
developing countries in particular, most of their innovative activities would get unrecognized 
by this approach. Most attempts to measure national technological capabilities or innovation 
systems in developing countries therefore try to take into account more information than just 
patents.  
While commendable, and consistent with suggestions in the literature, taking into ac-
count more information also represents a challenge, both with respect to data availability and 
in terms of method. Such exercises easily run into problems because, typically, most devel-
oped market economies figure prominently among those with good coverage, while develop-
ing countries and former socialist economies often lack data on many potentially useful indi- 
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cators.  Based  on  the  preceding  discussion,  Table 1,  adapted  from  Fagerberg  and  Srholec 
(2008), presents an overview of various factors that has been identified in the relevant litera-
ture as being particularly relevant for the measurement of technological and social capabili-
ties along with examples of possible empirical indicators.  
 
Table 1. Measuring capabilities 
 
Dimension  Measure 
Science, research and 
innovation 
Scientific publications, patents, R&D (total/business), innovation 
counts 
Openness  Openness to trade, foreign direct investment, research cooper-




International (ISO) standards, total quality management (TQM), 
lean production, just-in-time 
ICT infrastructure  Telecommunications, internet, computers 
Finance  Access to bank credit, stock-market, venture capital 
Skills   Primary, secondary and tertiary education, managerial and tech-
nical skills 
Quality of governance  Corruption, law and order, independence of courts, property 
rights, business friendly regulation 
Social values  Civic activities, trust, tolerance, religious ethics, attitudes to-




As discussed earlier, the concept of technological capability refers to the ability to de-
velop, search for, absorb and exploit knowledge commercially. An important element of this 
is what Kim (1997) termed “innovation capability.” There are several data sources that cap-
ture different aspects of this. For example, the quality of a country’s science base, on which 
invention and innovation activities to some extent depend, may be reflected in articles pub-
lished in scientific and technical journals. Research and development (R&D) expenditures 
measure some (but not all) resources that are used for developing new products or processes, 
while patents count (patentable) inventions coming out of that process. However, R&D data 
are not available for many developing countries. Patent data, on the other hand, are available  
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for all countries but as noted above many if not most innovations are never patented. So, as 
for many other indicators, this gives only a partial view of what we wish to measure. Firms’ 
own judgments about their innovativeness (innovation counts) is another possible source of 
information but such data are only available for a relatively small number of countries and a 
limited time span (see, however, the next section, and the chapter by Mairesse and Mohnen, 
this volume).  
Openness (or interaction) across country borders may facilitate technology transfer 
(spillovers)  and  stimulate  innovation.  This  issue  is  as  mentioned  above  particularly  em-
phasized in work inspired by the “new growth theories”. The applied literature on the subject 
has mostly focused on four channels of technology transfer across country borders : trade, 
foreign direct investment, migration and licensing (for overviews see Cincera and Van Pot-
telsberghe 2001, Keller 2004 and this volume). Some of these data sources are in scarce sup-
ply for developing countries, especially the latter two, with predictable consequences for the 
research that has been carried out on this subject. We discuss this issue in more detail in Sec-
tion 5 of this chapter. 
Another important aspect of  technological capability mentioned by Kim (1997) is 
“production capability.” A possible indicator of this might be the adoption of quality stand-
ards (ISO 9000). Although ISO certification is mainly procedural in nature, it is increasingly 
seen as a requirement for firms supplying high quality markets, and is therefore likely to re-
flect a high emphasis on quality in production. Moreover, although earlier studies such as 
Lall (1992) did not place much emphasis on capabilities in ICT, nowadays a well-developed 
ICT infrastructure must be regarded as a critical factor for a country that wish to catch up. 
Arguably this holds not only for production capability but for the ability to innovate as well. 
Possible indicators reflecting ICT use may be number of personal computers, internet users 
and fixed/mobile phone subscribers. These indicators are available for most countries.  
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The important role that a country’s financial system may play in mobilizing resources 
for catching-up was pointed out already by Gerschenkron, Abramovitz and Lall. Kim in-
cluded this in his definition of “investment capability.” It is also emphasized by a host of re-
cent research (see, e.g., King and Levine 1993, Levine 1997, Levine and Zervos 1998). Au-
thors in the capability literature attached a qualitative dimension to this that is difficult to 
measure with the available data. What we can measure is the (quantitative) development of 
the financial sector of a country, for example as reflected in the amount of credit (to the pri-
vate sector) or by capitalization of companies listed in domestic capital markets.  
A different set of factors, emphasized by for example Abramovitz and Lall, and for 
which there is solid support in the literature, relates to education and skills (Nelson and 
Phelps 1966, Barro 1991, Verspagen 1991, Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; for an overview see 
Krueger and Lindahl 2001). Both Abramovitz and Lall were especially concerned about spe-
cialized managerial and technical skills but this is again an example of information that is 
hard to come by, especially for a broad sample of countries on different levels of develop-
ment. What is available for most countries are more basic education statistics such as the lit-
eracy rate, the teacher-pupil ratio in primary schools and the rates of enrolment in secondary 
and tertiary education.  
The importance of governance and institutions, furnishing economic agents with in-
centives for creation and diffusion of knowledge, is generally acknowledged in the literature.. 
Although such factors often defy “hard” measurement, especially in a broad cross-country 
comparison, there exist some survey-based measures, often collected by international organi-
sations, that may throw some light on these issues. For example, there now exists survey data 
reflecting how easy it is to set up and operate a business, the extent to which law and order 
prevails, independence of courts, whether (intellectual) property rights are enforced, political 
stability or how widespread corruption is conceived to be (Djankov et al. 2002 and 2003,  
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Kaufmann et al. 2003, Botero et al. 2004, La Porta et al. 2004, Park 2008, Djankov 2009 and 
World Bank 2009).  All these aspects are potentially important for innovation and may, to 
some extent at least, be achieved within quite different political systems.
7  
However, the impact of government’s actions on innovation activities and develop-
ment outcomes may as pointed out by Abramovitz also depend on the prevailing social values 
in society such as, for example, tolerance, honesty, trust and civic engagement. Such values, 
facilitating socially beneficial, cooperative activities, are often seen as expressions of so-
called “social capital” (Putnam 1993, for an overview see Woolcock and Narayan 2000). The 
fact that the type of factors taken up by the literature on social capital may matter for eco-
nomic development is widely accepted. For instance, Kenneth Arrow pointed out more than 
three decades ago that “It can plausibly be argued that much of the economic backwardness 
in the world can be explained by lack of mutual confidence” (Arrow 1972, p. 357). The prob-
lem is rather how to measure it. One possible source of information that has been exploited to 
throw some light on the issue is the “World Value Survey”. Knack and Keefer (1997) used 
such data to analyze the relationship between trust, norms of civic behaviour and membership 
in groups on the one hand and economic growth on the other for a sample of 29 (mostly de-
veloped) countries. However, the limited time and country coverage of these data has, until 
recently at least, precluded its extension to a sizeable part of the developing world.  
Given the relatively large number of potentially useful indicators there is obviously a 
lot of information to exploit when attempting to use these data to measure the various capa-
bilities identified in the literature. One of the key challenges is how to combine this rich in-
formation into a smaller number of dimensions (e.g., capabilities) with a clear-cut economic 
interpretation. The most widely used approach to construct composite variables is to select 
relevant  indicators  and  weigh  them  together  using  predetermined (usually  equal)  weights 
                                                 
7 Thus we find it useful to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, the “quality of governance” with respect 
to innovation and economic life more generally and the character of the political system on the other. The meas-
ures we discuss here concern mainly the former aspect (quality of governance).  
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(Archibugi and Coco, 2005). The problem in this case is that the choice of weights tends to 
be quite arbitrary. An alternative approach, pioneered by Adelman and Morris (1965, 1967), 
uses so-called “factor analysis” (Basilevsky 1994) to advise on questions like these. This 
method is based on the very simple idea that indicators referring to the same dimension are 
likely to be strongly correlated, and that we may use this insight to reduce the complexity of a 
large data set (consisting of many indicators) into a small number of composite variables, 
each reflecting a specific dimension of variance in the data. 
Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) used factor analysis on data for 115 countries and 25 
indicators between 1992 -2004. The analysis led to the selection of four principal factors 
jointly explaining about three quarter of the total variance of the set of indicators. The first 
(and quantitatively most important) of these loaded highly on several indicators associated 
with “technological capability” such as patenting, scientific publications, ICT infrastructure, 
ISO 9000 certifications and access to finance. However, it also correlated highly with educa-
tion, so it cut across the distinction in the literature between “technological” (Kim 1997) and 
“social” capabilities (Abramovitz 1986). They suggested to interpret it as a synthetic measure 
of the capabilities (or “factors”) influencing the “development, diffusion and use of innova-
tions”, quoting Edquist (2004)’s definition of an innovation system, hence the name “innova-
tion system” for this factor. Their findings are reproduced in Figure 1 below, which plots the 







Figure 1. GDP per capita and innovation system (average level over 2002-2004) 
Source: Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) 
 
As is evident from the graph there is very close correlation between the “innovation 
system variable” and economic development as reflected in GDP per capita. To the extent 
that there are deviations from the regression line this primarily comes from a group of re-
source rich economies (OPEC countries for instance), having slightly higher GDP per capita 
levels than the quality of their innovation systems would indicate, and some of the former 
centrally-planned economies for which it is the other way around. Fagerberg and Srholec’s 
study indicates that the most advanced innovation systems are to be found in smaller count- 
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ries (in terms of population) such as Australia, Denmark and Norway.
8 These three countries, 
it may be noted, are low by international standards not only on patents but also on R&D, still 
they excel economically. Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) suggest that the explanation for this 
difference may be that these countries have well developed capabilities for exploiting know-
ledge. 
Table 2 presents a comparison of different composite variables aiming at measuring 
(national) technological and/or social capabilities (activities). The ArCo measure, developed 
by Archibugi and Coco (2004), was constructed as the average of eight different indicators 
reflecting various aspects of technological capability (patents, publications, ICT, electricity 
consumption and education) for 162 countries in the late 1980s and 1990s. Hence it is by 
design a relatively broad measure. The technology and capacity competitiveness indexes de-
veloped by Fagerberg et al. (2007), were developed with similarly broad purpose in mind, as 
reflecting capabilities necessary for exploration and exploitation of technology, respectively. 
The SOCDEV variable, initially developed by Adelman and Morris (1965) and later updated 
by Temple and Johnson (1998), is an amalgam of structural indicators (share of agriculture, 
urbanization etc.), socio-economic characteristics (role of middle class, social mobility, liter-
acy  etc.)  and  the  development  of  mass  communication  (measured  through  the  spread  of 
newspapers and radios in the population). Temple and Johnson (1998) suggest using this as a 
measure of “social capability” or, alternatively, “social capital.” Finally, the Human Devel-
opment Index is assumed to reflect the level of “social” development (e.g., welfare) as re-
flected in statistics on health and education (UNDP, 2004).  
 
 
                                                 
8 This result differs from those reported by Furman et al. (2002) and Furman and Hayes (2004) which, based on 
evidence from patent statistics, emphasize large economies such as the US, Japan and Germany as being among 
the global leaders.   
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Table 2. Correlation between measures of national capabilities 
 
  Indicator  Reference  Reference 
period 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
(1)  ArCo  Archibugi and 
Coco (2004) 
2000    0.90  0.93  0.92  0.85  0.89 




2000-04  115    0.74  0.85  0.89  0.96 
(3)  Technology 
competitiveness 
Fagerberg, et al. 
(2007) 
2002  90  79    0.84  0.53  0.72 
(4)  Capacity com-
petitiveness 
Fagerberg, et al. 
(2007) 
2002  90  79  90    0.69  0.87 
(5)  SOCDEV  Temple and John-
son (1998) 
1957-62  73  57  53  53    0.88 
(6)  Human devel-
opment index 
UNDP (2004)  2004  154  114  89  89  68   
 
Note: Above the diagonal is the correlation coefficient between pairs of measures and below the diagonal is for 
each of these pairs the number of (common) observations. 
 
The main lesson to be drawn from Table 2 is the very close correlation between these 
measures. For example, the correlation coefficient between the ArCo and the Innovation Sys-
tem measures is 0.90. Hence the ranking implied by these measures appears robust. Second, 
there is a very close correlation between these measures and the Human development index, 
which to some extent is to be expected due to their overlapping nature. It is also consistent 
with the finding in the literature of a close relationship between technological and social ca-
pabilities (Fagerberg and Srholec 2008).  
The finding that economic development and capability building go hand in hand is 
suggestive. But correlation, it may be noted, is in itself no proof of causation. Fagerberg and 
Srholec (2008) provided some evidence (in the form of econometric tests) supporting the 
proposition that capability building affects development positively. However, since many of 
the relevant data sources used to measure capability-building exist only for a few years (and 
in some cases for a single year only), there is very limited scope for causality testing. Hence 
the possibility that economic development in some sense affects capability building (or some 
aspects of it) positively cannot be excluded. As longer time series become available for many  
 
30 
relevant data sources, it will be possible to learn more about these relationships and this is an 
important topic for future research.  
Capability building may also be influenced by long-run factors related to the history 
of the country (Acemoglu, et al. 2001, 2002), its geography or nature (Gallup et al. 1999, 
Masters and MacMillan 2001, Bloom et al. 2003, Alesina et al. 2003, Sachs et al. 2004). Fail-
ing to take this into account may lead to biased inferences (with respect to policy, for in-
stance). Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) found that unfavourable factors related to history, ge-
ography and nature did indeed influence the possibility of developing a well-working innova-
tion system negatively. They saw this as an additional argument for developing aid because it 
confirmed that some countries are much worse placed than others for reasons beyond the con-
trol of people living today (or their politicians). 
  
4. Firm-level innovation in developing countries 
  
In this section we move from the macro to the micro level; from the technological capabilities 
of countries to the innovation activities in firms. Traditionally, indigenous firms in develop-
ing countries have been portrayed as passive adopters of foreign technologies. However, as 
emphasized in Section 2, from the late 1970s insights about how firms operate started to re-
veal that technological catching up required more than just import of capital goods. As the 
research has shown, even basic production capabilities cannot be taken for granted in the de-
veloping part of the world, and hence need to be created (Kim 1980, Teitel 1981, Fransman 
1982, Dahlman and Westphal, 1982, Katz 1984 among others). Moreover, conditions in de-
veloping countries often turn out to be quite different from those in which the technology was 
originally developed, so that to be able to put it into efficient use, local firms need to adapt 
the imported technology to differences in inputs, tastes, customs and cultures (Evenson and  
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Westphal, 1995). In the process of doing so, creation of new knowledge and innovation may 
occur. 
Arguably, a very sharp distinction between innovation and diffusion (or imitation), 
may not be very useful in the context of developing countries (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). Typi-
cally what happens, also in developed country settings, is that innovation tends to continue 
during the diffusion phase (Rosenberg 1972, Metcalfe 1988). So, even though firms in devel-
oping countries do depend heavily on diffusion of technology developed elsewhere, there 
may still be substantial scope for innovation and growth by improving the imported technol-
ogy (Fransman 1982, Voss 1988, Hobday 1995, Kim 1997). Such incremental or minor inno-
vations consist of context-specific improvements along the prevailing technological trajector-
ies. However, although minor in a technological sense, these improvements can be of major 
economic significance (Hall 2004). 
 It also needs to be emphasized that technological capability in developing country 
firms is much more than R&D. As Bell and Pavitt (1993) have pointed out, most firms in 
developing countries innovate on the basis of a broad range of capabilities. These are, they 
argue, typically concentrated in the departments of maintenance, engineering or quality con-
trol (rather than in, say, a R&D department). This does not mean, however, that R&D is un-
important. For example, Kim (1980) emphasized the role of R&D efforts for firms’ ability to 
assimilate foreign technology, especially at more advanced stages of development. Of great 
importance according to Kim (1980) is also dense interaction with other firms or organiza-
tions in the local environment – so-called “linkage” capabilities in the terms of Lall (1992) – 
which may help to unlock the internal constraints for innovation that often hinder firms in 
developing countries with insufficient internal technological capabilities to succeed in their 
endeavours. This, of course, concurs with the emphasis in recent literature (see Section 2) on 
seeing firms’ innovation activities from a systemic perspective.   
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Figueiredo (2006), in a recent survey, points out that our knowledge about innovation 
in developing country firms has been constrained by the fact that the available evidence has 
been overwhelmingly qualitative in character. In general, these studies seldom comprise more 
than a small number of case-studies, mainly of large firms, in a single industry or country. 
Definitions, typologies and ways of measurement tend to vary from one study to another, 
creating problems for comparative work and efforts to generalize the findings. This state of 
affairs has also made it difficult to carry out statistical tests of the various hypotheses that 
have been asserted in the literature about innovation processes in developing countries.  
It  should  be  noted,  though,  that  until  recently,  this  situation  applied  to  advanced 
countries as well. But from the early 1990s onwards efforts were made to collect more infor-
mation on innovation activities of firms through surveys based on the so-called Oslo Manual 
(Smith 2004). In the beginning these surveys were mostly confined to member states of the 
European Community, hence the label “Community Innovation Surveys” (CIS), but more 
recently a number of non-European countries, including some developing ones, have started 
to collect the same type of information (Jaramillo et al. 2001, UNU-INTECH 2004, Blankley 
et al. 2006). These efforts resulted among other things in a manual (the so-called Bogota 
Manual, see Jaramillo et al. 2001) for how to carry out innovation surveys in developing 
countries. The authors of the Bogota Manual argued that the original Oslo-approach to inno-
vation was too narrow and needed to be broadened to take into account factors such as or-
ganisational change, training, use of ICTs etc. in a better way. These concerns subsequently 
led to revisions of the Oslo Manual, the third edition of which include a separate appendix on 
measurement of innovation in developing countries (OECD, 2005) based to a large extent on 
the Bogota Manual. 
According to the third edition of the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005, p. 46) “an innova-
tion is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or  
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process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business practices, 
workplace organisation or external relations.” Arguably, this broad definition of innovation is 
close to the one originally offered by Schumpeter (1934). However, in the CIS survey it suf-
fices for the innovation to be new to the firm, it does not necessarily have to be new to the 
market or to the world as a whole. Thus innovation in this sense includes activities that 
Schumpeter would have classified as imitation.
9 This departs somewhat from the Schum-
peterian perspective, based on a relatively sharp distinction between innovation and imitation, 
but is consistent with the emphasis on incremental innovation and the close relationship be-
tween innovation and diffusion emphasized in the recent literature. However, from a com-
parative perspective this entirely subjective definition of innovation may also create prob-





In Europe, several innovation surveys have been already conducted, from the early 1990s 
onwards. The results indicate a clear correlation between innovative activity and the level of 
development: the higher the level of GDP per capita the higher the share of firms reporting to 
take part in innovation activities. However, although innovation, especially of the product 
type, tends to be more frequent in more economically advanced settings, the figures also re-
veal that innovation is a quite widely dispersed phenomenon, not limited to the most devel-
oped parts of the EU.  
Table 3 presents some main results from innovation surveys in countries in the pro-
cess of development. We have chosen to include some countries that some decades were very 
                                                 
9 See Fagerberg (2003, 2004) for an extended discussion of the Schumpeterian contribution and different defini-
tions of innovation.  
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rather backward but which since has managed to substantially reduce the difference vis-à-vis 
the developed part of the world, hence the term “catching-up economies”.. In cases where 
several surveys have been conducted we chose the most recent (which tend to be of higher 
quality).
10 It should be emphasized, however, that the figures need be treated with some cau-
tion, because there are differences in formulation of the questions, length of the reference 
period and sampling methods (UNU-INTECH 2004). To take just one example, some of 
these surveys have been limited to the manufacturing sector, for which the frequency of in-
novation is known to be higher than in the rest of the economy. Nevertheless, the result that 
innovation is quite frequent also in developing economies seems to be supported. About one 
fourth of firms reported to have innovated in China, where the survey conformed to high 
quality standards, and the results from Brazil or Turkey were not very different. In other 
cases, such as Thailand and Russia, the figures are markedly lower, though. In the former 
case this may have to do with the fact that the reference period was confined to a single year, 
which has implications for the propensity of firms to provide a positive answer. In the Rus-
sian case, however, several innovation surveys have been conducted with broadly similar 
results, indicating that the low level of innovation activity reported there may be a real phe-
nomenon. 
 
                                                 
10  Several other developing countries, including Columbia, Cuba, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Singapore, 
Trinidad-Tobago and Venezuela, have also made attempts to collect similar data. Due to comparability concerns  
we have chosen not to include the results from these exercises here.   
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Table 3: Innovation surveys in catching-up economies 
 
















period  Product  Process 
Slovenia  18,405  88%  2,960  02-04  20  22 
Korea
a)  18,271  61%  ..  02-04  36  23 
Taiwan  18,247  34%  3,356  98-00  28  33 
Czech Rep.  17,634  74%  6,188  03-05  27  30 
Hungary  14,836  77%  3,950  02-04  14  13 
Slovakia  12,803  73%  2,195  02-04  15  17 
Estonia  11,892  79%  2,201  02-04  37  33 
Croatia  11,639  77%  3,094  04-06  17  24 
Poland  11,608  87%  ..  02-04  15  19 
Argentina
 a)  11,421  76%  1,627  02-04  39  37 
Lithuania  11,042  94%  1,639  02-04  17  20 
Latvia  10,101  ..  2,990  02-04  9  10 
South Africa  9,290  37%  979  02-04  42  35 
Chile
a)  9,103  15%  706  99-01  43  40 
Russia  9,101  ..  ..  04  Less than 10% 
Mexico
a)  9,038  69%  1,515  99-00  27  24 
Malaysia
a)  8,496  19%  749  00-01  32  27 
Uruguay
a)  7,981  98%  814  01-03  23  26 
Turkey  7,460  ..  ..  04-06  22  23 
Bulgaria  7,212  80%  13,710  02-04  14  8 
Brazil  7,196  ..  10,600  01-03  20  27 
Romania  7,193  78%  9,180  02-04  15  18 
Thailand  7,091  43%  2,582  03  6  5 
Tunisia  6,812  79%  586  02-04  51  49 
China
a)  6,043  82%  31,436  04-06  25  25 
 
Note: 
a Manufacturing firms only. 
Source: National statistical offices and other sources. 
 
Another source of information on innovation in developing countries that deserves 
mentioning here is the Productivity and Investment Climate Survey (PICS) of the World 
Bank. In this survey, which covers around 50,000 firms in more than 100 (mostly) develop-
ing countries, firms were asked about various aspects of their business activities, including 
innovation and learning (World Bank 2003). Table 4 summarizes some of the results with 
respect to innovation and development (GDP per capita in PPP, constant 2000 USD). Since 
we are concerned about the representativeness of the data, we include only datasets of around  
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one thousand (or more) observations, which reduces the evidence to about two dozen sur-
veys. Another concern is that despite the fact that these surveys are coordinated by the World 
Bank, the questions about innovation have changed between different vintages of the ques-
tionnaire, which may have an impact on the reported results. To control for these differences, 
we group together countries with similar questionnaires.
11 
Table 4: Evidence on innovation from Productivity and Investment Climate 
Surveys organized by the World Bank 
 










Product  Process 
Questionnaire version 1: 
China  2,496  1,498  98-00  21  30 
China  2,787  2,375  99-02  24  33 
Questionnaire version 2: 
Poland  12,488  968  02-04  35  34 
Turkey 
a  9,302  1,323  03-04  36  42 
Brazil
 a  7,883  1,640  97-02  68  68 
Thailand 
a  7,224  1,042  05-06  48  46 
Thailand 
a  5,933  1,385  01-02  50  52 
Egypt 
a  4,332  977  02-03  15  11 
Egypt
 a  4,687  995  04-05  19  .. 
Morocco
 a  3,107  831  00-02  25  35 
India 
a  2,004  2,240  03-04  40  16 
Vietnam
 a  1,942  1,149  03-04  44  45 
Questionnaire version 3: 
Mexico 
a  11,142  1,119  03-05  35  34 
Ukraine  6,048  848  05-07  57  .. 
Nigeria 
a  1,736  945  04-06  54  53 
Bangladesh 
a  1,071  1,201  04-06  33  45 
Turkey  10.870  1,148  05-07  45  .. 
 
Note: 
a Manufacturing firms only 
Source: World Bank (2003, 2008). 
 
                                                 
11 For example, in China, the first entry in the table, firms were asked whether they “entered new business line” 
and “introduced new process improvements”. Firms in Brazil and other countries in the second group of count-
ries in the table were asked variations around questions whether they “developed (successfully) a major new 
product line” and “acquired new technology that either substantially changed the way the main products are 
produced or allowed the production of new products”. Much broader definitions were used in the most recent 
wave of the surveys, included at the bottom of the table, referring to “any new or significantly improved pro-
ducts” and “any new or significantly improved production processes including methods of supplying services 
and ways of delivering products”.  
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The overall impression from these data is, as before, that innovation is a quite frequent 
phenomenon in developing countries.
12 Similarly to the CIS surveys, innovations in the PICS 
survey are new to the firm, not necessarily new to the market or to the world as a whole. 
However, since firms in developing countries can benefit from imitation of technologies al-
ready in use in the developed part of the world, they may – everything else equal - be more 
likely to introduce the “new to the firm” innovations than their counterparts in Europe or 
elsewhere.  Probably much of this is related to diffusion of advanced technology from abroad 
- “innovation through imitation” as Kim (1997) puts it - rather than major “new to the world” 
technological breakthroughs.  But as pointed out above this does not at all make these innova-
tions less relevant economically.  
 
Econometric studies based on CIS and PICS data 
 
Stylized facts on the propensity of firms to innovate are informative but do not reveal much 
about factors that explain innovation in firms and about its effect on performance. To delve 
deeper into such issues researchers have attempted to use econometric models, and we dis-
cuss aspects of this work in the following. Tables 5 and 6 provide an overview of the studies 
taken into account here.
13  
A natural starting point is to look for variables explaining innovation, which is the 
question addressed by the first set of papers considered here (Table 5). The column to the far 
right lists the key explanatory variables taken into account. In spite of the fact that the mod-
els, samples and methods differ, the results seem to be quite robust. First of all, as in devel-
                                                 
12 An intriguing finding is that, with an exception for China, the propensity to answer positively is much higher 
in the PICS than in the CIS surveys. We are not aware of any attempt to explain this result, which occurs in spite 
of the fact that the definitions are not all that different. The major difference between the two surveys is that in 
the CIS the questionnaire is more elaborate and the term “innovation” is used.  
13 It should be pointed out that the list is unlikely to be exhaustive, because there is a lot of work in progress 
along these lines.
 Moreover, studies based on other sources of data than innovation, such as for example the 
traditional R&D surveys (or various surveys occasionally organized by research project), are not included.   
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oped countries, large firms are more innovative than smaller ones but the latter tend to report 
relatively higher proportion of sales of innovative products. The age of the firm, on the other 
hand, is not a conducive factor for innovation. Firms with more well-developed technological 
capabilities, broadly defined (e.g., not only internal R&D but also capabilities in design, en-
gineering, quality standards, adoption of ICT, marketing, management and skills) are clearly 
more innovative. The same goes for firms that use external sources of knowledge intensively 
and  interact  actively  with  customers,  suppliers  and  other  parts  of  the  innovation  system. 
These positive results do not carry over to measures of foreign ownership, which did not 
come out as significantly correlated with innovation in almost half of the cases considered, 
and this also holds for the relationship between exports and innovation.
14  
 
                                                 
14  Surprisingly, perhaps, the effect of (openness to) imports has been rarely taken into account by these studies. 
Nevertheless, when included, the effect of import openness has often turned out be positive and statistically 
significant, in sharp contrast to the mixed results of foreign ownership and exports. Another set of studies, not 
included in the table because they focused on exports as the dependent variable, considered the possibility of a 
reverse causality from innovation to exports. Özçelik and Taymaz (2004), de Araújo (2007), Chudnovsky, et al. 
(2007) and Correa, et al (2007) and Damijan et al. (2008b) found positive and statistically significant correla-
tions between innovation and exports in Argentina, Brazil, Slovenia and Turkey, but not in Ecuador.  
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Table 5: Estimates of the propensity of firms to innovate based on micro data from CIS/PICS in catching-up ec-
onomies 
Key results 
Author(s)  Survey  Country(s)  Sample 















































































Pamukçu (2003)  CIS  Turkey   1,108
a  2probit  INNOV  +        +  0    0  0  +    0  Y     
Lee (2004)  CIS  Malaysia  501
a  Logit  INNOV  +  −            0  −        Y     
Oerlemans and Pretorius (2006)  CIS  South Africa  189
b  OLS  INNSALE  −    0  +  +  +  0  0  0        Y     
Crespi and Peirano (2007)  CIS  Chile  1,048
a  Hprobit  INNMKT  +    +        +        +    Y     
Goedhuys (2007a)  PICS  Tanzania  257  Probit  INNPDT  0  0  +  +  +  +  +  0          Y     
Gonçalves, et al (2007)  CIS  Argentina  1,256
a  Probit  INNMKT  +    +  +    +    −  +  +  +    Y     
          INNPCS  +    +  +    +    0  0  +  +    Y     
    Brazil  6,626
a    INNMKT  +    +  +    +    +  0  +  +    Y     
          INNPCS  +    +  +    +    +  +  +  0    Y     
Hegde and Shapira (2007)  CIS  Malaysia  1,819  Logit  INNPDT  +  −  +  +  +    +  0  0        Y     
          INNPCS  +  0  +  +  +    +  0  0        Y     
          INNORG  +  0  +  +  +    +  0  0        Y     
Sung and Carlsson (2007)  CIS  Korea  1,124
ab  Logit  INNPDT  0  0  +        +  0  0      0  Y     
          INNPCS  +  0  0        +  +  0      +  Y     
Srholec (2007)  CIS  Czech Rep.   3,801  Mlogit  INNOV  +  −            +          Y  Y   
Almeida and Fernandez (2008)  PICS  43 countries  15,522
a  Probit  INNPCS  +  −  +    +  +    ±  +  +      Y    Y 
Falk (2008)  CIS  6 new EU  10,018  Probit   INNMKT  +  0            +  +        Y    Y 
          INNPDT  +  0            +  +        Y    Y 
          INNPCS  +  0            +  +        Y    Y 
        Flogit
 b  INNSALE  −  −  +  +    +  +  +  +        Y    Y 
Jaklic, et al. (2008)  CIS  Slovenia  1,972
b  Probit  INNOV  +    +    0    +  0  0    0    Y     
Karray and Kriaa (2008)  CIS  Tunisia  300
 a  Probit  INNPDT  0    +    +      −          Y     
Srholec (2008)  PICS  28 countries  15,818  Mlogit  INNPDT  +  −  +  +  +                Y    Y 
Srholec (2009)  CIS  7 new EU   28,846  Probit  INNOV  +  −            +  +        Y    Y  
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Table 6: Estimates of the link between innovation and productivity based on micro data from CIS/PICS in catch-
ing-up economies 
Key results 
Author(s)  Survey  Country(s)  Sample 
































































































Benavente (2006)  CIS  Chile  438
a  CDM  Y/L
e  +    +  0              +      Y     
Chudnovsky, et al. (2006)  CIS  Argentina  1,410
a  CDM  Y/L
d  −        +  0  +        +  0  0  Y     
Jefferson, et al. (2006)  CIS  China  5,451
a  CDM  Y/L
e      +  +                +    Y     
          PROFIT      +  +                +    Y     
Goedhuys (2007b)  PICS  Brazil  1,061
a  2LS  y
d  −  +        0  0    +  +  +  +  +  Y  Y   
Goedhuys, et al (2008a)  PICS  Tanzania  187
a  OLS  Y/L
e  0    +      0  0    0  +  +  +    Y     
Goedhuys, et al (2008b)  PICS  5 countries  389
c  OLS  Y/L
e  0    +      0  0    0    +  +    Y    Y 
      365
c    Y/L
e  0    +      0  0    +    0  0    Y    Y 
      956
c    Y/L
e  0    +      0  0    +    +  0    Y    Y 
Lee and Kang (2007)  CIS  Korea  2,539
a  WLS  y/l
d  +  −        0  +    +  0      +  Y     
de Negri, et al. (2007)  CIS  Brazil  1,860
a  CDM  K/L  +        +            +  +  +  Y  Y   
          K  −  −        +  +              Y  Y   
Roud (2007)  CIS  Russia  497
a  CDM  Y/L
d  −    +  +      0        +    0  Y     
Masso and Vahter (2008)  CIS  Estonia   1,142
a  CDM  Y/L
de  −    +      +  +  +          +  Y     
          y/l
de  −    +      0  0  +          0  Y     
Raffo, et al (2008)  CIS  Argentina   1,308
a  CDM  Y/L
d  0    +      0  0  0      +  +    Y     
    Brazil  9,452
a    Y/L
d  +    +      +  +  +      +  +    Y     
    Mexico  1,515
a    Y/L
d  +          +  +  0      0  +    Y     
Damijan, et al (2008a)  CIS  Slovenia  4,947  CDM  Y/L
e  −    +    +              +  0  Y     
      4,171    y/l
e      +    +  +  +          +  +  Y     
Goedhuys and Srholec (2009)  PICS  42 countries  19,147  Mlinear  Y/L




Variables:    Methods:   
Y/L, K/L  = Output (Y) or capital (K) per employee (L); small caps denote growth  2LS  = Two-stage Least Square 
PROFIT  = Profitability given by profit to sales  2probit  = Two-stage probit 
INNOV  = Dummy for product or process innovation  CDM  = Crépon-Duguet-Mairesse model 
INNMKT  = Dummy for product innovation new to the market  Hprobit  = Heckman probit 
INNPDT  = Dummy for product innovation  Flogit  = Fractional logit 
INNPCS  = Dummy for process innovation  Mlinear  = Multilevel linear 
INNORG  = Dummy for organizational innovation  Mlogit  = Multilevel logit 
INNSALE  = Sale of innovated products as % of turnover  OLS  = Ordinary Least Square 
SIZE  = Size of the firm  WLS  = Weighted Least Square 
AGE  = Age of the firm     
R&D  = Internal R&D represented by a dummy or as % of turnover     
BROAD  = Broader non-R&D capabilities, such as design, engineering, ISO norms, ICT, marketing, knowledge management etc. 
EDU  = Education, skills or training of the labour force     
BUY  = Acquisition/purchase of external embodied (machinery) or disembodied (external R&D, licensing, etc.) technology 
LINK  = Linkages (cooperation, sourcing information, etc.) with other organizations     
FOR  = Dummy for foreign ownership     
EXP  = Export given by a dummy (EXPBIN) or as % of turnover (EXPINT)     
IMP  = Import given by a dummy or as % of turnover/inputs      
Sector  = Sectoral differences     
Region  = Regional differences     
Country  = National differences     
 
Symbols:  Notes: 
+  = Significantly positive at least at 10% level 
a Manufacturing (industrial) firms only 
−  = Significantly negative at least at 10% level 
b Innovative firms only 
0  = Not significantly different from zero at 10% level 
c 389 in food, 365 in textiles and 956 in garments and leather industries 
Y 
d Sales denote the output 
 
= Yes 
e Value added denotes the output 
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 Another important question considered in the literature concerns the impact of inno-
vation on firm performance (Table 6). A widely used econometric approach for assessing this 
effect is the so-called Crépon-Duguet-Mairesse (CDM) structural model (Crépon et al. 1998), 
which in a sequential way considers links between R&D, innovation and labour productivity. 
Using CIS type data this framework has been applied to at least eight developing countries. 
Statistically significant effects of at least one of the innovation variables have been confirmed 
in most cases. Using a different approach, Lee and Kang (2007) found a positive effect of 
process innovation, but no effect of product innovation, on productivity. In contrast, Goed-
huys and associates, in series of papers based on the PICS data, failed to confirm any signifi-
cant effect of innovation on productivity (Goedhuys, 2007ab and Goedhuys, et al 2008ab).  
 Finally, we examine how differences in contexts to which firms belong have been 
taken into account by the available literature. Information on this is included in Tables 5 and 6 
in the last three sub- columns under “Key results”. As is evident from the tables all of the 
studies controlled in one way or another for sectoral differences but only some considered 
territorial differences. Gonçalves et al. (2007) and Raffo et al. (2008) estimated the same 
model on data for a number of different countries, which allowed them to throw light on the 
underlying structural and institutional differences. Goedhuys et al (2008b), Almeida and Fer-
nandes (2008), Falk (2008) and Srholec (2009) pooled micro data from different countries, 
using dummies for possible country effects, many of which were significant. In a related ex-
ercise Goedhuys (2007b) and de Negri et al. (2007) found regional dummies to be significant 
predictors.  
Hence, there appear to be important differences across countries, regions and sectors, 
but the approach commonly used (based on dummy variables) is unable to explore the reasons 
for those differences.  To do that, a more useful approach might be to specify separate vari-
ables for the underlying “framework conditions” that contribute to these contextual effects. 43 
 
Another reason for concern may be that standard regression techniques usually assume that 
observations  are  independent  from  each  other.  However,  if  observations  belonging  to  the 
same group, such as a sector, region or country, are influenced by context-specific factors, 
this assumption is likely to be violated. In such cases so-called multilevel modelling (Gold-
stein, 2003) - also known as hierarchical, random coefficient or variance component models – 
which relaxes the independence assumption may be a more efficient tool for the analysis.  
Srholec (2007), using multilevel modelling on CIS data from the Czech Republic, 
found that various regional factors, including the quality of the regional innovation system, 
influenced the propensity of firms to innovate, but that the strength of these effects depended 
on various firm level characteristics. Using a multilevel model on PICS data from 28 count-
ries, mostly developing, Srholec (2008) demonstrated that in addition to firm level character-
istics, including a rich set of capability indicators, a number of variables representing the 
national framework conditions also contributed to the explanation the likelihood of firms to 
innovate. Similarly, Goedhuys and Srholec (2009), in a follow-up study based on evidence 
from PICS in 42 countries, showed that various national factors influenced firms’ abilities to 
benefit from their own technological capabilities. For example, firms located in countries with 
a higher R&D intensity benefitted considerably more from their own R&D spending than oth-
erwise similar firms in low R&D environments. Hence, national and firm level capabilities 
interact in the process of development.  
A shortcoming of the literature surveyed in this section is that panel data in most cases 
do not exist. This makes it difficult to consider the issue of the direction of causality in a satis-
factory manner. In principle, instrumental methods may help dealing with this problem but 
good instruments are hard to find. Griffith et al. (2006), in the context of CDM modelling,  
point out that despite the best efforts, one by and large still deals with correlation rather than 
causation, and this probably goes for many of the studies considered here.  44 
 
5. International sources of innovation for development 
  
While the building of national capabilities may be the aspect of catching-up that is most di-
rectly influenced by domestic policy, the process also depends on foreign sources of know-
ledge and technology. Knowledge from abroad may flow through a variety of channels, such 
as migration, licensing, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).
15 Some of these flows are 
not mitigated through markets, such as in the case of scientific and technical cooperation with 
foreign governments (as part of development aid). However, knowledge may also flow in as a 
direct result of market transactions, such as the licensing of a patent. Other market-related 
forms include knowledge flows associated with trade and investment, or labour migration 
(although the latter is usually from developing nations to the developed world). Arora et al. 
(2004) argue that there is now also an explicit market for knowledge itself, for example in the 
form of engineering services, but this is mostly relevant for developed countries.  
The “capabilities” literature that was summarized above has mostly focused on the 
catch-up experience of individual countries (e.g., Lall and Urata, 2003). From these individual 
country histories, it appears that there is no single answer to the question of which channels 
are most important for sourcing knowledge from abroad. In Asia, Japan is the earliest exam-
ple of a successful catching-up country. Industrialization in Japan started in the latter half of 
the 19
th century, but a significant break in the process occurred with World War II. Goto and 
Odagiri (2003) describe how, in the post-war phase, the Japanese sourced technology mainly 
by importing capital goods, licensing of technology (and other forms of alliances) from West-
ern firms, reverse engineering, and the use of trade-missions and other forms of intelligence 
targeted at learning about foreign technology. In summary, Japan acquired advanced foreign 
technology through all channels except for inward FDI” (Goto and Odagiri (2003, p. 89).  
                                                 
15 For overviews see Cincera and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) and  Keller (2004). 45 
 
The absence of FDI as a channel for knowledge transfer is also typical for some other 
Asian catching-up countries that followed suit after Japan, such as Korea (Kim, 1997, 2003) 
and Taiwan (Aw, 2003). Like Japan, these countries tended to rely on “arms-length” relations 
with foreign firms, combined with the building up of capabilities of domestic firms, facilitated 
by domestic policies for learning (e.g., education, industrial policy and trade policy). A direct 
role of foreign firms in the domestic economy was explicitly discouraged by policy, at least in 
the  initial  phase  of  catching-up  (this  changed  in  the  late  1970s  and  1980s,  especially  in 
Korea). However, in some other Asian countries, most notably Singapore, FDI was an im-
portant channel of knowledge transfer from the beginning of the catching-up process (Wong, 
2003).  
The relatively low importance attached to FDI as a mean of during catching-up in the 
above cases may partly be related to the existence of strong domestic firms. Amsden (1989) 
has argued that in Korea, the existence of large domestic conglomerate firms was a decisive 
factor in generating growth. As in Japan and Taiwan, these firms, helped by an active gov-
ernment policy, were able to build up their own technological capabilities by means of assimi-
lating foreign knowledge. This process took the form of gradual learning, resulting eventually 
in the ability to undertake product innovation by means of R&D. However, an important 
intermediate step in this process of building up capabilities was so-called Original Equipment 
Manufacturing (OEM), in which Asian firms would manufacture products for foreign (Japa-
nese as well as Western) firms, according to exact specifications supplied by the foreign firms 
(Hobday, 2000).   
Thus, multinational enterprises play an important role in the transfer of knowledge 
across borders and not only through FDI. They are responsible for a large part of R&D per-
formed in the private sector in the developed part of the world
16 and for them knowledge is a 
                                                 
16 According to the "Innovation R&D Scoreboard" prepared by the Department of Trade and Industry in the UK, 
in 2007, Microsoft was the largest corporate R&D spender in the world, with a total R&D budget of about 8.2 46 
 
key asset and source of competitive advantage. Such knowledge-assets can be exploited in 
foreign markets through three main mechanisms (Blomström and Kokko, 1998): the licensing 
of technology to foreign actors, investment in the foreign country, or exports.  
Data on licensing and other forms of “arms-length” knowledge trade, arguably a deci-
sive channel of knowledge transfer, has until recently not been very widely available. Hence, 
there is little (econometric) work on the impact of technology payments in developing coun-
tries, despite the fact that this seems to be an important channel for knowledge transfer, espe-
cially in the early phases of catching-up.  Technology inflows measured in this way were 
typically in the order of magnitude of about 0 – ½ % of GDP in the early 21
st century, with 
the highest values recorded in the developed part of the world (including South-East Asia). As 
such, they are an order of magnitude lower than FDI flows, which may range up to 5% of 
GDP.  
FDI  is  what  clearly  has  received  most  scholarly  attention,  although  as  mentioned 
above this does not seem to be warranted by the literature.
17 Knowledge transfer associated 
with FDI can take the form of joint ventures between domestic and multinational firms, other 
forms of cooperation such as strategic alliances, linkage effects (i.e., contacts with local sup-
pliers or customers), labour mobility, informal contacts between the MNE and local firms, 
and demonstration effects (i.e., an MNE showing that a technology works reduces uncertainty 
for local firms). The literature also identifies increased competition as a source of spillovers of 
FDI to the host economy, i.e., the effect on domestic firms that are forced to increase effi-
ciency in order to compete with the foreign firms.  
                                                                                                                                                       
billion US$. According to the IMF database, this is comparable to the total GDP of Mozambique (8.1 billion 
US$). The median value of GDP in the IMF database is 20.7 billion US$, i.e., about 2½ times the Microsoft 
R&D budget. According to the R&D Scoreboard, there are 29 (69) companies that spent more than 2 (1) billion 
US$ on R&D in 2007. 
17 The literature on FDI, MNEs and spillovers of their knowledge-related activities addresses both developed and 
developing countries. An early survey is Blomström and Kokko (1998), a more recent one is Görg and Gre-
enaway (2004). 47 
 
The impact of FDI is partly related to the strategy of foreign firms with regard to their 
presence in developing nations. For instance, although most foreign affiliates may be mere 
passive adopters of foreign technology, some may be actively involved in knowledge creating 
activities in developing countries and this may increase the possibility for spillovers. Using 
data from innovation survey in Argentina, Bell and Marin (2004) and Marin and Bell (2006) 
examined the role of knowledge-generating activities of foreign affiliates for knowledge spil-
lovers. They found that while spillovers are likely to be generated by foreign affiliates that are 
technologically active in the host country, there was no significant effect in that regard for 
those that were not.  
Because most of the channels through which FDI generates spillovers are hard to ob-
serve directly, unless a case study approach is used,
18 most of the empirical literature relies on 
estimating productivity equations, usually based on a production function approach, for do-
mestic firms or sectors, in which MNE presence is one of the independent variables. The early 
literature of this type (e.g., Blomström and Persson, 1983, in a study on Mexico) relied on 
including the share of foreign ownership in regressions explaining sectoral productivity dif-
ferences, or as an industry-level variable in a microeconomic dataset. This approach cannot 
distinguish between the different spillover channels, but it does allow, by the inclusion of 
firm-level variables related to absorptive capacity, for a heterogeneous impact of spillovers  
among (local) receiving firms. Blomström and Kokko (1998) conclude that the evidence from 
these early studies is mixed, and suggests that whether or not spillovers from MNEs to local 
firms take place depends on many aspects of the local and sectoral context. Due to a lack of 
detailed data, many studies are not able to measure these factors, and, moreover, analyses 
covering more than a single country were (and still are) rare.  
                                                 
18 The electronics industry in Asia is such a case. A series of case studies (e.g., Kim 1997, Ernst and Kim 2002 
and Hobday and Rush 2007) has shown how Asian electronics firms used knowledge from foreign firms to go 
through a series of stages: from mere assembly to process engineering and, eventually, product development 
through R&D and FDI played an important role in this process of technological upgrading.  48 
 
The more recent econometric literature on FDI spillovers has used more refined indi-
cators and methods. With regard to indicators one trend has been to distinguish between hori-
zontal (intra-industry) and vertical (inter-industry) spillovers. Wooster and Diebel (2006) pro-
vide an overview of 32 econometric studies of the impact of FDI in developing countries 
(among which they include transition countries in Eastern Europe), covering a publication 
time span of 1983 – 2004.
19 They find positive effects of spillovers in about half of the in-
cluded observations (an observation is a regression result, of which there are generally more 
than one per paper analyzed), and slightly less than half of the reported coefficients are statis-
tically significant. Among the most salient findings of this exercise are that using an employ-
ment-based measure of foreign presence as the independent variable increases the likelihood 
of finding positive spillovers; that analyses on firm-level data find significant spillovers less 
often; that in more recent periods it is more likely to find positive spillovers; that spillovers 
are more likely to be positive in Asia; and that it is important to include R&D and time period 
fixed effects as control variables. 
On the methodological front the use of panel data is an important in aspect in recent 
econometric studies on the subject. But according to Wooster and Diebel, the use of panel 
data does not change the results significantly. In contrast, Görg and Strobl (2001), in a similar 
meta-study for a sample of both developed and developing nations, report that using panel 
data usually yields negative or insignificant spillovers. One needs to keep in mind, however, 
that the panels used in this literature are usually short, while FDI spillovers are essentially 
long-run in nature, and that the impact of FDI spillovers may be conditional on unobserved 
factors, such as for example absorptive capacity, that feed into the (usually undocumented and 
time-invariant) fixed effects in panel regressions. 
                                                 
19 They do not include studies dealing with vertical spillovers, such as Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) and Damijan 
and Knell (2005). 49 
 
Trade is a different way in which developing countries can benefit from knowledge 
flows (see the chapter by Keller in this volume for a more extensive overview). Spillovers 
from trade may come in the form of what Griliches (1979) called rent spillovers. This refers to 
the idea that because of competition, quality improvements of traded goods are not fully re-
flected in price increases. Trade can also expose firms to new product specifications, and this 
can lead to imitation. The work on knowledge flows related to trade has mostly focused on 
sectoral or macro-data, mainly because trade data are usually not available at the firm level. 
The study by Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997) arrived at an optimistic conclusion with 
regard to the impact of trade-embodied knowledge flows in developing countries. Their meth-
odology involves the estimation of a production function in which "imported R&D” is one of 
the independent variables. “Imported R&D” is R&D performed in the exporting country, but 
embodied in the exports, through which it may have an impact on growth in the importing 
country.
20 They estimated that, in 1990, R&D spillovers from developed to developing na-
tions were worth about 22 billion US$, which would be comparable to about half of the total 
global development aid during that period. Jacob and Meister (2004) applied a similar model 
to the case of Indonesia, also incorporating linkages at the sectoral level, as well as market 
structure. They also concluded that trade embodied knowledge flow are important for produc-
tivity growth in that country.  
In summary, the available work on foreign knowledge inflows into developing nations 
point out that the sources of these knowledge flows are many and heterogeneous in nature. 
MNEs play an important part in these flows, by their nature as "fluent" entities in the global 
economy. However, whether or not FDI and other international knowledge sources contribute 
to the performance of local firms in developing countries, depends on local circumstances and 
capabilities of the firms on the "receiving end" (Criscuolo and Narula, 2008). It has also been 
                                                 
20 The Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister methodology has come under critique, on the account that the trade-
related weighting scheme may be spurious. This is discussed at length in the chapter by Keller in this volume. 50 
 
suggested that the contribution of the various channels of international knowledge transfer 
may change over time. Arguably, changes in governance of the global economy may have 
closed off catching-up paths that were followed by countries such as Japan and Korea, for 
example because trade policies that formed an essential part of the catching-up process in 
these countries are no longer allowed under current WTO rules (Chang, 2003), or because 
tighter rules about intellectual property rights make the use of some knowledge transfer chan-
nels that previously were important for catching-up more difficult or costly (Kim, 2003). 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has focused on the literature on innovation and development. Until recently most 
people would have considered it odd to consider innovation as an important issue for develop-
ing countries, and many probably still see it that way. This skepticism is based on the widely 
shared view that innovation primarily is of interest for high-tech firms in advanced envi-
ronments. According to this perspective new technologies emerge in advanced economies. 
However,  since  technology  in  this  perspective  has  strong  public  good  properties,  it  will 
gradually diffuse to the developing part of the world.
21 Hence, diffusion of new technology, 
created through innovation in the advanced part of the world, may according to this perspec-
tive be expected to work as powerful equalizer in the global economy, making it possible for 
poor countries to quickly raise their standards of living. 
Although the logic of this “public good” approach to the role of technology and inno-
vation seemed convincing at first, it gradually became evident that it could not be the whole 
story. Two pieces of evidence in particular came to undermine the approach. First it became 
                                                 
21 The only worry, according to this perspective, is that the spread of such benefits becomes too quick (and ex-
tensive), so that the incentives to development of new technology in the in the developed part of the world are 
substantially reduced. To avoid this outcome, it is argued, legal instruments that prevent such easy, costless dif-
fusion are needed. Followers of this perspective therefore place great emphasis on intellectual property rights as 
in incentive to secure steady technological progress in the advanced corners of the globe and hence in the global 
economy as a whole.  51 
 
evident that the convergence in technology and productivity that the approach predicted did 
not materialize. In a long run perspective differences were at the increase, not the other way 
around. How could this happen? Second, the most famous examples of countries that man-
aged to escape the low development trap and raise their standards of living towards developed 
country levels relatively quickly were far from being passive adopters of new, developed 
countries technologies. On the contrary countries such as Korea (South), Taiwan and Singa-
pore, which were among the prime success stories, placed great emphasis on generating what 
later became known as “technological capabilities” through a concerted effort by public and 
private sector actors and apparently it paid off handsomely. Why were such activist develop-
ment strategies that contradicted much common wisdom, seemingly much more successful 
than the “hands off” approach advocated by leading authorities and institutions such as the 
IMF and the World Bank, what is often called the “Washington consensus”? 
These were some of the questions that gradually became more central to the agendas 
of politicians, development experts and economists through the closing decades of the millen-
nium and the beginning of the next and it led as we have shown to the emergence of new 
theories, approaches and evidence. Arguably, the process started already back in the 1950s 
when economic historians started to analyse actual catching up processes and came up with 
generalizations that were far from the liberal “hands off” approach in favor among econo-
mists. As a consequence a stream of research emerged, mainly among economic historians 
and economists with a more heterodox leaning, that focused on “capability building” of vari-
ous sorts as essential for development processes. This way of looking at things gained mo-
ment during the 1980s and 1990s as the success of the Asian tigers (and Japan before that) 
became more widely recognized and studied. The term “technological capability”, originally 
developed as a tool for analysing the Korean case, gradually became more widely used among 
students of development processes, and a large amount of research emerged using this ap-52 
 
proach to understand the performance of firms, industries and countries in the developing part 
of the world. 
It is fair to say, however, that in spite of these developments, many economists con-
tinue to be unconvinced by the “capability” approach, may be because it is seen as meso- or 
macro approach lacking proper micro foundations, theoretically as well empirically.  How-
ever, it is particularly at this point that the research is most strongly increasing today, in the 
form a massive data gathering effort on innovation activities in developing countries, and ana-
lyses based on these new sources of information. These new developments, which follow 
similar efforts in the developed part of the world (particularly Europe) from the 1990s on-
wards,  has  vividly  demonstrated  that  the  “high  tech”  approach  to  innovation  which  has 
framed much thinking and policy advice on the subject is strongly misleading when it comes 
to understanding the relationship between innovation and development. In fact, the evidence 
shows that innovation is quite widespread among developing country firms, is associated with 
higher productivity (e.g., development) and, as in the developed part of the world, is depend-
ent on web of interactions with other private and public actors. This is not to say that innova-
tion in developed and developing countries are identical in every respect but in qualitative 
terms innovation is found to be a powerful force of growth in both and therefore an issue that 
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